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In recent years the notion of human dignity has become the center of an 
important debate in the fields of bioethics and biolaw. Much of the discussion is 
about the meaning of this notion, about the role that it plays or should play in 
this area, about its real utility, and about the risk of misusing it as a merely 
rhetorical concept.  
Currently, the concept of human dignity is torned between the emphatic 
support it receives from the legal system, and its contentious reception by 
philosophical scholars. It should be noted that the notion of human dignity is 
already at the foundation of the international human rights system which 
emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. Recent intergovernmental 
instruments relating to bioethics assign even a greater role to human dignity, 
which is presented as the ultimate rationale behind the new rules settled in this 
area. This trend is impressive enough to lead scholars to view dignity as "the 
shaping principle" of international bioethics
1
. Far from representing a shift 
merely in style, the higher profile accorded to this notion in bioethics is seen as a 
true shift in substance that needs to be carefully considered.
2
  
But on the other hand, a number of scholars have in recent years raised 
serious criticisms against the recourse to the notion of human dignity, which they 
regard as too vague, or purely rhetorical or political, or even useless for solving 
specific bioethical dilemmas. These objections have led to an important debate 
about the meaning, usefulness, and rational justification of this notion. 
The purposes of this paper are, first, to point out the striking contrast 
between the central role assigned to human dignity in international biolaw, and 
the controversial reception of this principle in philosophical bioethics; second, to 
claim that the paradoxical features of the notion of human dignity may, in a first 
stage, explain the difficulty in grasping its meaning and role; and finally, to 
argue that those same paradoxes, if well examined, far from obscuring the 
meaning of the notion of human dignity, bring the full weight of its significance 
(III). 
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I. Human dignity between law and philosophy 
 
The emphasis on human dignity is very visible in recent intergovernmental 
instruments relating to bioethics, which constantly appeal to human dignity as 
the ultimate ground of their provisions. This can be observed, for instance, in the 
three UNESCO declarations relating to bioethics: the Universal Declaration on 
the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997), the International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data (2003), and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights (2005). If we focus our attention on the 2005 Declaration we will 
notice that respect for human dignity embodies not only the central aim of the 
Declaration (Art. 2.c), but that it is also presented as the first principle governing 
the field of biomedicine (Art. 3), as the main argument against discrimination 
(Art. 11), as the framework within which cultural diversity is to be respected 
(Art. 12), and even as the interpretative criterion of all the provisions of the 
Declaration (Art. 28). 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997), or 
“Oviedo Convention”, is another important example of the recourse to human 
dignity. According its Explanatory Report, “the concept of human dignity (...) 
constitutes the essential value to be upheld. It is at the basis of most of the values 
emphasized in the Convention”3. The title itself of the Convention in its 
complete form includes this notion.
4
 The Preamble mentions dignity three times: 
the first, when it recognizes “the importance of ensuring the dignity of the human 
being”; the second, when it recalls that “the misuse of biology and medicine may 
lead to acts endangering human dignity”; the third, when it expresses the 
resolution of taking the necessary measures “to safeguard human dignity and the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application 
of biology and medicine.” The purpose itself of the Convention is formulated 
appealing to human dignity. According to Article 1, such purpose is “to protect 
the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without 
discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental 
freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine”. Also Article 2 
of the Convention is interesting in this respect because it offers a direct corollary 
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of the idea of human dignity: the principle of primacy of the human being over 
science and society. This principle embodies the idea that every individual, every 
patient, even the gravely ill one, every research participant, has unconditional 
value, and therefore should not simply become instruments for the benefit of 
science or society.  
The key role attached to human dignity in international norms relating to 
bioethics is not surprising if one notices that dignity is “one of the very few 
common values in our world of philosophical pluralism”5, to such an extent that 
today most people assume, as an empirical fact, that human beings have intrinsic 
worthiness. This common intuition has been called the "Standard Attitude".
6
  
Nevertheless, the great value that international law assigns to human dignity 
is in open contrast with the much more controversial reception of this notion in 
philosophical bioethics. Some criticize the recourse to dignity as purely 
rhetorical, or as an easy means to condemn some potential undesirable uses of 
biotechnology (for instance, human cloning) when other arguments fail.
7
 
Furthermore, the notion of human dignity would be unable to play any normative 
role in bioethics because it is flawed by inherent vagueness which allows its use 
for supporting totally different and even opposed positions, as it happens, for 
instance, in the debate about euthanasia and assisted suicide. Other scholars 
denounce that dignity is often used as “mere rhetorical dressing, adding little 
more to the policy debate than the weight or cachet of the concept”.8 In even 
more provocative terms it is argued that "dignity is a useless concept in medical 
ethics and can be eliminated without any loss of content" because it means no 
more than respect for persons or their autonomy.
9
  
How can this serious divergence between legal norms and academic 
philosophical reflection be explained? The next section aims to argue that this 
contrast is in part due to the fact that the concept of human dignity entails several 
paradoxes. 
 
                                                 
5
 See Herbert Spiegelberg, "Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy", in 
Human Dignity. This Century and the Next, ed. R. Gotesky and E. Laszlo, New York, Gordon 
and Breach, 1970, p. 62. 
6
 Dan Egonsson, Dimensions of Dignity. The Moral Importance of Being Human, Dordrecht, 
Kluwer, 1999, p. 34. 
7
 See Ulfrid Neumann, "Die Tyrannei der Würde", Archiv für Recht und Sozialphilosophie, 
1998, 2, p. 153. 
8
 Timothy Caulfied and Andrew Chapman, “Human Dignity as a Criterion for Science 
Policy”, Plos Medicine, 2005, 2(8), p. 736-738. Available online at: www.plosmedicine.org 
9
 Ruth Macklin, "Dignity is a useless concept", British Medical Journal, 2003, vol. 327, p. 
1419-1420. 
 134 
II. The paradoxes of human dignity 
 
1. The first paradox: the priority of praxis over theory 
 
The first paradox posed by the idea of human dignity is the strong contrast 
between the practical and the theoretical approaches to it. From a practical point 
of view, it seems well that no civilized social system would be possible if people 
were denied the recognition of their intrinsic worth and of the basic rights that 
derive from it. This means that the recognition of human dignity and human 
rights is, first of all, the result of a very practical need. We know by historical 
experience that every time that society abandons the idea of inherent dignity it 
inevitably falls, soon or late, into barbarism.
10
 Thus, there are very concrete 
reasons for affirming by law the principle according to which each individual 
deserves unconditional respect by the mere fact of being human.  
However, from a theoretical perspective, it is extremely difficult to 
justify human dignity (and perhaps to justify any objective moral principle) 
without having recourse to some metaphysical notions (such as human good, 
human nature, the spiritual dimension of human beings, etc.). We live in 
postmodern times that strongly reject any substantive philosophical reflection on 
these fundamental issues that have occupied philosophers for centuries.
11
 This is 
a paradox because we know by experience that we dramatically need the idea of 
human dignity, but we do not exactly know how to justify it.  
This same paradox was pointed out fifty years ago by the French 
philosopher Jacques Maritain. Having been involved in the preparatory work of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (thereafter, UDHR), he could not 
hide his astonishment at the fact that people with the most different political, 
cultural and religious backgrounds were able to agree on the fundamental rights 
to be respected. He wrote that “[a universal agreement on human rights] can be 
achieved, not on common speculative notions, but on common practical notions, 
not on the affirmation of the same conception of the world, man and knowledge, 
but on the affirmation of the same set of convictions concerning action”.12  
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Preamble). 
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beyond the purpose of this paper. 
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Considering this priority of practical needs over theoretical speculation, 
one might ask: if the international community has already reached a consensus 
on the need to respect human dignity and human rights, why caring about the 




Personally, I think that the foundational question has not become 
superfluous, since it is still far from clear that agreement alone suffices to justify 
human dignity and human rights. First, because consensus is a very fragile 
foundation: today’s accord may disappear tomorrow. Second, and more 
importantly, because the merely contractualist explanation of dignity and rights 
offers a very superficial, if not wrong, picture of these rich concepts. In reality, 
we do not respect people simply because we have formally agreed on that, that 
is, simply because some laws or international agreements require such respect. 
Rather it is the other way round: those laws and treaties have been adopted 
precisely because we think that respecting people is the right thing to do. The 
moral requirement of respect for persons is previous to its recognition by law.  
 
 
2. The second paradox: the ex negativo approach 
 
Another paradox, which is very closely related to the previous one, is that the 
meaning of dignity is easier to grasp when we consider what is contrary to 
dignity rather than what is in conformity with it. Evil is easier to recognize than 
goodness. It is indeed when we are confronted to the worst things that can be 
done to someone that we better understand, by contrast, what "dignity" means. 
This is why this notion is often characterized in negative terms, for instance, by 
saying that it embodies the idea that“there are some things that should not be 
done to anybody, anywhere”,14 or that people must “never be treated in a way 
that denies the distinct importance of their own lives".
15
 Even the Kantian 
categorical imperative according to which no one is to be treated as a mere 
means to another’s end can be regarded as example of this via negativa. 
It is indeed paradoxical that we begin to get the picture of human dignity 
by considering those behaviours that seriously disregard it: torture, slavery, 
degrading treatments, inhuman working conditions, etc. These situations of 
extreme humiliation help us to become aware that human dignity is a very real 
requirement of human interaction and not a merely metaphysical hypothesis. 
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Perhaps this experiential approach is unable to offer any academic definition, but 
provides us with a vivid experience of what it means to have a dignity which is 
disregarded in dehumanizing treatment. 
It is not by chance that, while most human rights are couched in positive 
terms (“Everyone has the right to…”), there are a few ones, those that aim to 
protect people against the most serious violations of human dignity, that are 
formulated in negative terms, as prohibitions: “No one shall be held in slavery or 
servitude”; “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment” (Articles 4 and 5 of the UDHR, 
respectively). The difference is not merely semantic, but has significant practical 
implications: the rights framed in negative language are regarded as absolute, in 
the sense that they are not subject to any exceptions, while most rights can be 
limited in certain circumstances, provided that restrictions are necessary and are 




3. The third paradox: human vulnerability 
 
A third paradox is that human dignity may become more visible in weakness 
than in power, in vulnerability than in self-sufficiency. It may indeed be more 
patent in the most vulnerable human beings: in newborns, in small children, in 
the elderly, in the sick, and in the poor. This is paradoxical because human 
dignity has been traditionally associated with the highest rational capacities, with 
the human power to dominate nature, with autonomous decision-making 
capacity. But in the most vulnerable (for instance, patients, who are in need of 
help or who are dying), the dignity is not hidden by intellectual or physical 
abilities, or good health, or beauty. As a matter of fact, medical practice is 
constantly confronted with the human being in its nakedness, in its simple 
existence, and is required to discover the value of every patient in that context. 
Health care professionals are well aware that if they want to perform their job 
adequately, they must keep in mind that each patient, no matter what his or her 
diagnosis, is not a ‘case’ or a ‘disease’, a room number, but a person with a 
unique character.   
Incongruously, modern medical science is focused in an almost obsessive 
way in reducing human vulnerability and disease as if they were the absolute evil 
to be eradicated. Instead of viewing human vulnerability as an intrinsic element 
of existence, it tends sometimes to treat it as a merely technical fact that could be 
overcome simply through more technological progress. This approach is utopian 
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 “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
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because the possibilities of science are limited, and will be always be limited, in 
spite of all the scientific advances that can be done, at least by the fact that we 
are mortal beings. Science is radically unable to solve the problem of human 
existence as a whole; science is unable to respond to our search for the sense of 
life. Of course medicine has to fight disease and reduce its negative impact on 
our lives as much as possible, but without falling into the mistake of thinking 
that a life without self-sufficiency is meaningless and no more worth living. 
Rather on the contrary, it should regard vulnerability as a constituent element of 
human existence. This more holistic approach to health care can certainly 
contribute to help people suffering from serious diseases to give sense to their 
situation, especially when no treatment is available.  
 
4. The fourth paradox: the technological mastery over human nature 
 
The fourth paradox is related to the idea of a human’s mastery of nature by 
means of technological developments, which in the end leads to dominion over 
human nature itself. As Kurt Bayertz has rightly pointed out, the fact that human 
beings become master over their own nature necessarily implies that they are 
reduced to an object of their own subjectivity
17
. They are at the same time 
“subjects” and “objects”, and the increase of human subjectivity leads 
paradoxically to an increase of human’s objectivation. It is true that the notion of 
a human’s dominion over the earth is not new. At least, in the Western world, it 
has always been part of the Judeo-Christian heritage. The first chapter of the 
Book of Genesis is explicit in this respect.
18
 In this context, the special role of 
humans in relation to nature has traditionally been regarded as an expression of 
human dignity.  
However, since the 17th and 18th century, the idea of man’s supremacy over 
nature, patterned after the thinking of Descartes, Bacon, and Condorcet, took a 
totally different significance. Man was no more regarded as the steward of nature 
with special responsibilities for taking care of the earth and living beings, but he 
became the master of nature in the full sense of the word, that is, he was invested 
with absolute dominion over every living being, including himself.
19
 In this way, 
science and technology, which have always been regarded as expressions of the 
very special worth of human beings, risk at present blurring the sharp boundaries 
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between humankind and nature, and therefore, eroding the notion of dignity 
itself. This places us in a strange situation, especially if we note that the 
technological control over our nature is, in practice, not a control over ourselves, 
but over those who will succeed us.  
In recent years, Jürgen Habermas has pointed out this same problem with 
regard to preimplantation genetic diagnosis and germline interventions, which, 
he argues, risk leading us to a new form of domination of some individuals over 
others, that is, to an unfair control of future generations by the present 
generation. According to him, what is at stake in this field is nothing less than 
our self-understanding as subjects and not as mere objects produced by others. 
This is why he calls for a self-restraining of our emerging technological powers 







The paradoxical aspects of the idea of human dignity, far from being 
problematic, are very helpful, and maybe necessary, to better understand the 
meaning of this notion. These paradoxes could perhaps also contribute to explain 
why it is so difficult, or maybe impossible, to define dignity with great precision, 
and that the best we can do with this concept, is to try to approach it with the 
help of comparisons, analogies and examples, in an intuitive manner. This is not 
because dignity is an empty idea, but on the contrary, because it is too rich to be 
encapsulated in a definition. After all, if dignity refers to the unique value of 
every human being, how could such uniqueness be defined? Definitions are 
always generalizations that try to gather the properties that several entities have 
in common; but they are unable to cover what is unique or irreplaceable. But 
precisely this is one of the key ideas that the notion of dignity tries to express. It 
refers, not to a general and abstract human individual, but to this-concrete-human 
being who is in front of us.
21
 
Therefore, if our postmodern times make it problematic to begin from the 
"top", that is, from metaphysical or too abstract concepts to reach the idea of 
human dignity, perhaps the best we can do is to begin from the "bottom", namely 
from concrete relationships to other individuals as particular persons with 
distinctive needs. This kind of experiential approach can be found, for instance, 
in Emmanuel Levinas’ writings. He claims that ethics emerges primarily on the 
concrete level of the relationship from person to person and, for this reason, the 
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a nomen dignitatis. 
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contemplation of the human face is one of the most significant ways to discover 
the incommensurability of each individual. The relation to the face is "a relation 
with the other absolutely other, which I cannot contain, with the other in this 
sense infinite"
22
; the face of the other resists our power to assimilate him or her 
into mere knowledge. The face of the other silently remembers us the command: 
"you shall not commit murder"
23
. This approach does not find the moral "ought" 
inscribed within the laws of the cosmos. In other words, responsibility for the 
other is born primarily in the face to face situation and not in purely theoretical 
knowledge. This is why it does not commit any "naturalistic fallacy", because the 
starting point is not an "is" but already an "ought". Perhaps a more experiential 
approach like this (or similar ones), which take as starting point concrete human 
beings with their hopes and sufferings, could be able to bring a refreshed view of 
human dignity. 
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